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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 A jury concluded that defendants Alfred Teo and 
MAAA Trust were liable for violating (inter alia) the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 13(d) and 10(b) 
(15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) and § 78j(b)).  The District Court 
subsequently denied the Defendants’ motions for judgment as 
a matter of law and for a new trial.  It also ordered (inter alia) 
the Defendants to disgorge over $17 million, plus 
prejudgment interest amounting to over $14 million.  They 
now appeal alleging errors arising from the admission of 
certain evidence and the use of a general verdict form; and 
challenging the District Court’s disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest award.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order on all issues. 
 
I. 
 Alfred Teo is a businessman and an investor.  In 1992, 
he established the MAAA Trust.  Teo was the beneficial 
owner of the Trust, which also held various securities, for the 
period relevant to this appeal.  In February 1997 twenty-eight 
brokerage accounts controlled by Teo (including those of the 
Trust) held approximately 5.25 percent of the stock in 
Musicland.  Musicland was a Delaware corporation that was a 
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retailer of music, video, books, computer software and video 
games.   
 
 Musicland had a “shareholder rights plan” that could 
be activated when an individual or group reached 17.5 
percent ownership of the company’s stock.  This plan, 
commonly known as a “poison pill,” was in place to protect 
the company from a hostile takeover.  Once initiated, it 
enabled—among other things—shareholders to purchase 
stock at a lower price to dilute the holdings of the hostile 
buyer to a lower percentage.   
 
 Up to July 1998, in accord with Section 13(d), Teo 
properly disclosed his Musicland holdings on SEC Schedule 
13D, and those holdings were under the poison pill threshold.  
On July 30, 1998, Teo filed “Amendment 7” to his Schedule 
13D disclosure with the following statement:  “Teo ceased to 
have investment powers with respect to the [MAAA] Trust.” 1  
After July 30, 1998 Teo consistently reported that his 
ownership percentage in Musicland remained below 17.5 
percent.  Nonetheless, he continued to make investments in 
Musicland on behalf of the Trust.  In all, Teo filed three false 
Schedule 13D disclosures, and he failed to file numerous 
13Ds that were required when the change in the percentage of 
his ownership in Musicland exceeded the reporting threshold. 
                                              
1
 Schedule 13D requires the disclosure of (inter alia):  the 
identity of the purchaser, including beneficial owners; a 
description of the purpose of the purchase(s), including any 
plans or proposals to change the Board of Directors or to 
cause an extraordinary corporate transaction; and, the interest 
of all persons and groups making the filing.  17 C.F.R. § 
240.13d-101. (1997)) 
5 
 
 
 The Trust subsequently filed two Schedule 13Ds 
falsely stating that Teren Seto Handeleman, Teo’s sister-in-
law, had sole power to buy and sell Trust shares.  By failing 
to disclose his beneficial ownership of the Musicland stock 
held by the MAAA Trust, Teo under-reported his Musicland 
holdings, and failed to comply with his reporting obligations 
under Section 13(d).  Moreover, since Teo’s filings never 
disclosed his ownership of Musicland stock to be at or above 
the poison pill threshold, Musicland was kept in the dark 
about this fact and it never activated this plan.  This was 
Teo’s intent for filing the false reports.  
  
 Additionally, after March 10, 2000, the Trust stopped 
making amendments to its reports, even though changes in its 
Musicland ownership interest continually exceeded the 
reporting threshold.  The District Court concluded that Teo 
and the Trust controlled 17.79 percent of Musicland shares on 
August 2, 1998, and 35.97 percent on December 6, 2000.  
Their combined holdings in Musicland did not fall below 
17.79 percent through January 31, 2001.  
  
 Throughout this period, Teo made multiple requests to 
be placed on the Musicland Board of Directors (from 
December 1998 through September 2000), and during 2000 
he also pushed, unsuccessfully, for the selection of a number 
of other Board candidates.  Moreover, Teo repeatedly 
proposed that Musicland become privately held.  Teo 
successively worked with Goldsmith-Agio-Helms, Trivest 
Capital, and Financo on plans to take Musicland private.  He 
admitted that his motive for doing so was to open up the 
opportunity for him to cash out.  He did not file any Schedule 
13D disclosures on any of these activities. 
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 In December 2000, Best Buy Co. announced its all-
cash tender offer of all Musicland shares, and it acquired 
those shares in January 2001.  The stock price rose after the 
tender offer announcement.
2
  Teo sold a portion of his 
Musicland shares in the market, and all of the remaining 
shares to Best Buy as part of the tender offer.  The District 
Court determined that Teo’s original cost of acquiring his 
shares was $89,453,549 and that the gross proceeds from his 
sale of the stock amounted to $154,932,011.  The District 
Court set Teo’s profit from stock he held after July 30, 1998, 
(taking into account the date of his first SEC reporting 
violation) at $21,087,345, including shares held by the Trust, 
and those held by accounts that Teo directly controlled. 
 
 In April, 2004 the SEC filed a civil law enforcement 
action against Teo asserting violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act, Sections 13(d) and  10(b), and numerous SEC 
rules and regulations.
3
  The District Court granted summary 
judgment on a number of rule-violation claims that Teo does 
not challenge.  At trial, a jury concluded that Teo violated 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and that Teo and the Trust 
violated Section 13(d), Rule 12b-20, Rule 13d-1, and Rule 
13d-2.  Finally it held that the Trust violated Section 16(a) 
and Rule 16a-3.   
                                              
2
 Teo admits that, in the fall preceding the Best Buy deal, he 
received confidential communications about it from senior 
management at Musicland and he subsequently bought 
45,000 additional shares of Musicland stock.    
3
 In August, 2004, the Government indicted Teo.  He pleaded 
guilty to insider trading, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 
and 78ff(a) in June 2006.   
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 After trial, the District Court denied motions by Teo 
and the Trust for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of 
law.  It subsequently enjoined Teo and the Trust from future 
violations of securities law.  Finally, upon the SEC’s motion, 
the District Court held Teo and the Trust jointly and severally 
liable for paying the civil penalty and for the disgorgement of 
their illegally obtained profits.  
  
 Teo and the Trust now appeal the jury’s verdict, but do 
not directly challenge the ruling on the injunction or their 
joint and several liability.  Specifically, they appeal the 
District Court’s admission of Teo’s guilty plea allocution and 
an exhibit that they assert is false evidence.  They also claim 
that there was insufficient evidence to prove a “plans and 
proposals” theory of liability, and that this entitles them to a 
new trial because the general verdict slip creates ambiguity on 
the theory of liability grounding the jury’s verdict.  Finally, 
the Appellants appeal the District Court’s order disgorging 
over $17 million, plus prejudgment interest.
4
  We now turn to 
each of these issues.    
 
II. 
                                              
4
 The District Court subtracted both amounts paid by the 
Appellants in margin interest, and profits attributable to Teo’s 
insider trading from the total amount to be disgorged, 
reducing the disgorgement from $21,087,345 to 
$17,422,054.13. 
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 On June 7, 2006, Teo pleaded guilty to five counts of 
insider trading admitting that:  he received advance 
information that Best Buy was going to make a tender offer to 
purchase Musicland stock; that he was aware that this was 
private information; he was aware of his duty to refrain from 
acting on or disclosing it to anyone; and finally, that he 
enabled eight people to take advantage of this information.  
He also admitted that he passed this information on to the 
eight willfully, knowingly and with an intent to defraud.  The 
conduct underlying these admissions occurred 
contemporaneously with his Section 13(d) violations in the 
fall of 2000.  The SEC’s use of the admissions contained in 
the allocution was the subject of a motion in limine, and the 
District Court ruled that—presuming Teo testified—it was 
admissible.   
 During the SEC’s questioning of Teo at trial, it 
introduced—over the Appellants’ objections—Teo’s 
convictions and the allocution from his guilty plea to Section 
10(b) insider trading.  The Appellants now take issue only 
with the admission of the allocution.
5
   
 
 The District Court grounded its decision to admit 
Teo’s allocution on both Fed. R. Evid. 609 and Fed. R. Evid. 
                                              
5
 Teo argues that we should apply a de novo standard of 
review.  We review de novo “whether evidence falls within 
the scope of Rule 404(b),” but since we regard the allocution 
at issue to be appropriately considered in the context of Rule 
404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion standard.  United 
States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 727 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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404(b).
6
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a crime may not be 
used to prove a person’s character, but may be used to prove 
intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.  
We have long regarded this rule as inclusionary, meaning that 
“evidence of other wrongful acts [is] admissible so long as it 
[is] not introduced solely to prove criminal propensity.” 
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010).   
Moreover, we have adopted a four-prong test for admissibility 
under Rule 404(b):  (1) the evidence must have a proper 
purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 
402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial 
effect under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge the jury 
to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted.  United States v. Davis, 726 F3d 434, 
441 (3d Cir. 2013).  
  
                                              
6
 Rule 609(a)(2) states:  “[F]or any crime regardless of the 
punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can 
readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime 
required proving--or the witness's admitting--a dishonest act 
or false statement.”  Teo challenges the admission of the 
allocution on Rule 609, asserting that we have limited the 
admission of such evidence to the “number of convictions, 
the nature of the crimes, and the time and date of each.”  
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1970).  
Rule 609 was the basis for admitting Teo’s insider trading 
conviction (which is uncontested), but we need not address 
the admissibility of the allocution under Rule 609 because we 
conclude that Rule 404(b) provided the court with a solid 
foundation for its decision.   
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 The District Court, after reviewing the proposed 
evidence, concluded that the allocution would be probative of 
virtually all of the permissible reasons provided under Rule 
404(b):  Teo’s claimed absence of knowledge, his intent, and 
the absence of mistake.  It noted that the criminal case was 
“an offshoot” of the civil case, and that this evidence was 
relevant to “what [Teo] knew, what [Teo] did, [and] when he 
did it.”  We agree.  The allocution was probative of Teo’s 
willfulness and knowledge in evading SEC regulations as 
they related to his Musicland stock holdings.  
 
 The Appellants attempt to construe the insider trading 
conduct as irrelevant because it was subsequent to the acts 
underlying the issues raised in the civil trial.  This is factually 
incorrect.  The criminal acts occurred between September and 
December of 2000, the same time as some of the acts at issue 
here.  Moreover, the criminal and civil misconduct are all 
connected to Teo’s failure to comply with securities laws vis-
a-vis his Musicland holdings.  Particularly in the 
circumstances of this case, his admissions about his intent in 
the criminal matter were probative of his intent in the civil 
case.  This is true whether or not some of the conduct 
addressed in the civil suit predated the acts referenced in the 
allocution.   See United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 281 
n. 25 (3d Cir. 2012).  We find no error in the District Court’s 
determination of relevance.  
 
 The District Court also demonstrated an awareness of 
the potential for prejudice by noting from the outset that a 
limiting instruction would be necessary.  Highlighting  that 
this evidence “goes to the heart of the very issues are [sic] in 
this case,” the District Court concluded that “while its 
prejudicial, I don’t believe that the prejudicial effect 
11 
 
substantially outweighs the probative value.”  Again, we 
agree.  Particularly in light of the fact that Teo’s insider 
trading convictions were also part of the record (and are not 
appealed) we see no error by the District Court.
7
 
 
 Finally, citing to Becker, the Appellants argue that the 
limiting instruction was inadequate.  Becker v. ARCO 
Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  In Becker, the 
district court admitted evidence of an employer’s prior 
fabrication of a pretext for terminating an employee as 
relevant to a plan, pattern or practice in the case at bar, even 
though the event was completely unrelated.  Id. at 190-91.  It 
then provided a “cursory” limiting instruction to the jury 
about this evidence.  We reversed, partially due to the 
inadequate instruction.  Id. at 206.  This case is 
distinguishable on the relevance of the evidence.  Moreover, 
the instruction need not contain any particular language, as 
long as it adequately prevents unfair prejudice.  See United 
States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
District Court here did more than simply repeat the words of 
the rule, providing a meaningful delineation of character 
evidence from evidence that goes to intent and the absence of 
mistake.  Moreover, the instruction captures the key points of 
this Court’s Model Jury Instructions.  See Court of Appeals 
                                              
7
 The Appellants complain, among other things, that the 
SEC’s use of the allocution at the end of its cross examination 
was particularly prejudicial because it was more likely to 
make an impression on the jury.  However, so long as the 
evidence raised in the cross-examination was admitted and 
used for a permissible purpose, counsel is free to organize its 
examination of the witness in any manner it sees fit.   
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for the Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction § 4:29.  
Specifically, it said: 
 
Mr. Teo is not on trial for insider 
trading.  You may not consider 
this evidence as proof that Mr. 
Teo has a criminal personality or 
bad character.  This evidence is 
being admitted for more limited 
purposes; namely whether Mr. 
Teo knowingly and intentionally, 
with a plan and motive, 
committed the acts alleged in this 
and did not act because of 
mistake, accident or other 
innocent reason 
 
We do not see any error in the District Court’s limiting 
instructions.   
 As a result, we conclude that the balancing test of Rule 
403 supports a conclusion that any prejudice arising from the 
admission of the allocution was both outweighed by the 
probative value of the evidence and was properly limited by 
the instruction.  For all of these reasons, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion by admitting the allocution under Rule 
404(b).
8
   
                                              
8
 Even if the admission of this evidence had been error, we 
would have ruled that it was harmless.  The Appellants have 
not appealed the District Court’s admission of Teo’s 
judgment of conviction on insider trading, which of itself 
placed before the jury much of the potentially prejudicial 
information about which the Appellants now complain.  
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III. 
 The Appellants next claim that the SEC provided false 
evidence to the jury, and that the District Court abused its 
discretion by denying their motion for a new trial on this 
basis.  The issue centers on an exhibit,  PX103, that contained 
both a fax cover sheet and a marked-up draft of an 
amendment (“Amendment 7”) that Teo made to his Schedule 
13D filing.  The Appellants complain that the SEC knowingly 
presented this exhibit to the jury as one continuous document, 
ostensibly faxed by Teo’s counsel to Teo, when in fact the 
marked-up document was never faxed.
9
   
 
                                                                                                     
Moreover, with the accumulation of other evidence on Teo’s 
intent regarding the reporting violations, we are hard pressed 
to find any credible basis to rule that the allocution was 
substantially prejudicial to the Appellants. 
 
9
 The District Court authenticated the exhibit, which was 
included in the Joint Proposed Final Pretrial Order, without 
objection from the Appellants.  Accordingly, as per the 
agreement of the parties upon their submission of the joint 
proposed order, the Appellants waived their appeal of this 
issue.  However, the District Court did not treat the issue as 
waived when considering the Appellants’ motions for 
judgment as a matter of law and for retrial.  Regardless, we 
conclude that the Appellants’ assertion of false evidence is 
meritless.   
 
14 
 
 We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.  McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 
F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009).  A new trial is warranted when 
the government, “although not soliciting false evidence, 
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears at trial.”  United 
States v. Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
concept of false evidence is most often associated with 
instances of perjured testimony (See e.g. Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004)) and it is, to say 
the least, a stretch to apply it to the facts of this case.  
 
 The exhibit at issue was comprised of two documents 
that Teo submitted to the Government during his criminal 
prosecution in response to a motion to compel.  The first 
document is a fax cover sheet indicating that Teo’s counsel 
sent Teo a copy of Amendment 7 for his review prior to its 
submission to the SEC.  The second document is a marked-up 
draft of Amendment 7 prepared by Teo’s counsel.  There is 
no dispute that the marked-up draft was not the document that 
was referenced in the fax cover sheet.  In fact, there is no 
evidence that counsel ever gave the marked-up draft to Teo. 
  
 Yet, Teo’s counsel was the originator of the 
documents, having submitted the fax cover sheet and marked 
up document in response to a motion to compel during the 
criminal prosecution.   The Appellants have never disputed 
that Teo reviewed a document that is substantially similar to 
the marked-up version included in the exhibit.  Therefore, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that, from the time of its 
production, Teo has been complicit in the conclusion that the 
marked-up version was substantially the same as what Teo 
reviewed prior to its submission.  While the Appellants timely 
objected to the SEC’s use of the exhibit at trial, no one—
15 
 
particularly Teo—said at any time that any of the statements 
from the exhibit that the SEC referenced while Teo was 
testifying were incorrect or misrepresented.  Teo testified that 
he knew the contents of the amendment at issue and was 
aware that, as a result of filing this amendment, the public 
would believe that he no longer had beneficial ownership of 
Musicland stock purchased by the Trust. 
 
 While the exhibit theoretically could have created 
confusion, there is no evidence that it actually did, nor is there 
any evidence that it influenced the outcome of the trial.  The 
SEC never represented to the jury, willfully or otherwise, that 
the exhibit was one continuous document.  Moreover, any 
mistaken inference about the documents in the exhibit was 
adequately highlighted by the Appellants during trial and 
explained to the jury.  The District Court permitted the 
Appellants to distribute copies of the entire exhibit to the jury, 
pointing to irregularities in pagination.  As a result, to the 
extent that the formatting of the exhibit could have created a 
mistaken impression that the marked-up draft was faxed to 
Teo, the jury was fully apprised of the potential for this error.  
 
 Even if the combination of the two documents in one 
exhibit confused the jury—a contention for which we have no 
evidence—we do not have any basis to conclude that the 
exhibit prejudiced the outcome of the trial.  To the contrary, 
there was other evidence before the jury concerning Teo’s 
awareness of his representations to the SEC.  Therefore, if 
there was any error in admitting this exhibit, it was harmless.  
See United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 
2012).  For all of these reasons, as to Exhibit PX103, we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to grant a new trial on this basis. 
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IV. 
 The Appellants next contend that the District Court 
erred by denying their motions for judgment as a matter of 
law and for a new trial that claimed insufficient evidence.  In 
a challenge to the District Court's denial of judgment as a 
matter of law, we exercise plenary review, applying the same 
standard as the trial court.  Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 
303 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 
 The SEC asserted at trial that the Appellants violated 
Section 13(d) by failing to disclose plans and proposals for an 
extraordinary corporate transaction, and to change the Board 
of Directors.
10
  Appellants first assert that, regarding the 
District Court’s review of their challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence on the SEC’s plans and proposals theory, the 
District Court actually assessed the materiality of the 
evidence and mistook this for a review of sufficiency.  This 
                                              
10
 Schedule 13D, Item 4 states:  “State the purpose or 
purposes of the acquisition of securities of the issuer. 
Describe any plans or proposals which the reporting persons 
may have which relate to or would result in: . . . (b) An 
extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, 
reorganization or liquidation, involving the issuer or any of its 
subsidiaries; . . . (d) Any change in the present board of 
directors or management of the issuer, including any plans or 
proposals to change the number or term of directors or to fill 
any existing vacancies on the board.”  17 CFR § 240.13d-101 
(1997). 
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error, they claim, undermines the District Court’s conclusion 
that there was sufficient evidence on this theory of liability.  
  
 This assertion alone would be of no moment in many 
cases, because motions for judgment as a matter of law are to 
be denied “if there is evidence reasonably tending to support 
the recovery by plaintiff as to any of its theories of liability.”  
Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (citation to quotation 
omitted).  Yet, we have also ruled that:  “Where a jury has 
returned a general verdict and one theory of liability is not 
sustained by the evidence or legally sound, the verdict cannot 
stand because the court cannot determine whether the jury 
based its verdict on an improper ground.”  Wilburn v. 
Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Therefore, since the jury used a general verdict form in this 
case, the Appellants would receive a new trial if they were 
correct that the District Court both conducted a faulty review 
and reached the wrong result on the Appellants’ sufficiency 
of the evidence claim.  However, the District Court’s use of a 
general verdict form does not impact our ruling here because 
we conclude that the District Court’s analysis of the SEC’s 
plans and proposals theory of liability was not erroneous. 
   
 The District Court said:  “[T]he jury had sufficient 
evidence upon which to determine whether Teo’s plans and 
proposals regarding Musicland would have resulted in an 
extraordinary corporate transaction . . . .[or] a change to the 
board of directors.”  The Appellants seize upon the words 
“would have resulted,” and claim that the District Court 
ignored whether the evidence substantially showed 
“concrete” plans and proposals  (See Azurite Corp. Ltd. v. 
Amster & Co., 52 F.3d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1995)), and instead 
18 
 
mistakenly focused merely upon the materiality of the 
evidence to the plans and proposals theory.
11
  As a result, they 
claim that evidence suggesting nothing more than 
“embryonic” plans by Teo was mistakenly regarded as 
sufficient to ground the jury’s decision.  This misconstrues 
the District Court’s analysis. 
   
 The District Court, quoting Azurite, established the 
basis for its review of the Appellants’ motions by noting that 
“section 13(d) does not require disclosure of ‘preliminary 
considerations, exploratory work or tentative plans.’  Azurite 
Corp Ltd. V. Amster & Co., 844 F. Supp. 929, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994).’”  Borrowing further from Azurite, the District Court 
noted that “[p]lans or proposals should be disclosed where a 
course of action has been decided upon or intended.”  The 
District Court made clear that this was the standard it used to 
assess the evidence.  
  
 As to the record, the District Court highlighted the 
following facts.  In 1999 Teo met with representatives of 
Goldsmith-Agio, who produced a financial analysis of a 
proposal to privatize Musicland and discussed it in a meeting 
with both Teo and Musicland.  Musicland rejected this 
proposal.  Undeterred, Teo met with representatives of 
Trivest in early 2000 and signed a term sheet.  Trivest and 
Teo met with Musicland to discuss the plan.  Again, Teo was 
not successful.  However, in August of 2000 Teo began 
discussions about his privatization plan with a number of 
                                              
11
 The SEC does not contest the Appellants’ reliance on 
Azurite to express the appropriate standard for determining 
whether a particular plan or proposal is sufficiently formed to 
trigger reporting requirements under item 4 of Schedule 13D.     
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businessmen, culminating in meetings with a third investment 
bank—Financo.  Teo terminated this collaboration when he 
learned that Musicland was in negotiations to be sold.  The 
District Court concluded that Teo’s serial efforts with three 
investment banks to find backing for a leveraged buyout of 
outstanding Musicland stock was substantial evidence for a 
jury to conclude that Teo had a plan or proposal for an 
extraordinary corporate transaction.   
 
 As to evidence relating to the Board of Directors, the 
District Court detailed Teo’s numerous conversations with 
Musicland representatives both about his intention to become 
a Board member and about his intent to have three of his 
associates placed on the Board.  He sent the resumes of these 
individuals, along with his written request for them to be 
placed on the Board, to Musicland representatives.  These 
efforts spanned from 1998 up through 2000.  In fact, Teo 
made a request to be on the Musicland Board once a month 
during 2000. 
 
 In consideration of all of this, we understand the 
District Court’s holding to be that, in spite of Teo’s overall 
lack of success in his privatization efforts, the record 
contained sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Teo 
had decided upon or intended a course of action for an 
extraordinary corporate transaction and to change the Board 
of Directors, triggering a Schedule 13D reporting duty.  We 
do not see any error in the District Court’s conclusion that 
substantial evidence supported the jury’s decision.  
  
 As a result, we do not face the situation confronted in 
Wilburn, where a general verdict left open the possibility that 
one of the plaintiff’s theories of liability for which there was 
20 
 
insufficient evidence might have been the one on which the 
jury grounded its determination of liability.  Here, as the 
District Court held, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s 
verdict holding the Appellants liable for Section 13(d) 
violations, regardless of whether it relied upon the plans and 
proposals theory.  Therefore, we conclude that the District 
Court did not err by denying the Appellants’ motions for 
judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.
 12
    
 
V. 
 Teo and the Trust next challenge the District Court’s 
order to disgorge $17,422.054.13 in profit from transactions 
tainted by their violation of the Securities Exchange Act.  The 
Appellants do not appeal the calculation of the disgorgement, 
but rather assert the District Court wrongly granted the SEC’s 
motion for this remedy.  We review for an abuse of 
discretion.  SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 
(3d Cir. 1997).
13
 
 
                                              
12
 Appellants also contend that cumulative evidentiary errors 
support reversal even though, individually, there is no 
reversible error.  We reject this argument because no such 
cumulative error exists here.   
  
13
 Teo does not, as he did before the District Court, make an 
alternative argument challenging the District Court’s 
calculation of the disgorgement which would have been 
subject to a clear error review.  SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 
1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
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 The Appellants note that the profits to be disgorged by 
the District Court’s order  resulted solely from the sale of the 
Musicland shares under Best Buy’s tender offer.  They assert 
that the tender offer had nothing to do with their violations of 
Section 13(d) and Section 10(b), and that the District Court’s 
ruling is in error because it ignores the tender offer as the 
proximate cause of their profits.  The Appellants argue that 
the District Court should have required the SEC to 
demonstrate that disgorged profits ‘“proceed directly and 
proximately from the violation claimed and [are] not . . . 
attributable to some supervening cause.’”  See e.g. Wellman v. 
Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting 
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 719 (2d 
Cir. 1980)).
14
  They are not correct.  Wellman is distinguished 
                                              
14
 Appellants also cite to a case from the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit in which, relying on Supreme Court 
precedent, it required the District Court to use “[a]n approach 
that focuses on arriving at a figure that approximates the gain 
specifically resulting from Mr. Nacchio's offense [that] would 
better recognize ‘the tangle of factors affecting price’ that the 
Supreme Court addressed in [Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.v,. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005)].’”  United States v. 
Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1073-1075 (10
th
 Cir. 2009).   
However, because this was a sentencing case in an insider 
trading criminal prosecution it is clearly inapposite because 
compliance with the amount-of-loss calculation in the 
Sentencing Guidelines was the central concern.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1);  United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 642 
(6th Cir. 2013).  As the Sentencing Guidelines and a 
calculation of loss are not an issue in this case—for purposes 
of a remedy—no such concerns exists here.  See infra.  
Moreover, its citation to Dura Pharmaceuticals—a private 
22 
 
by the fact that it is a private civil enforcement action brought 
under an implied right of action, and is therefore—for reasons 
we will further explain—unpersuasive. 
 
 All civil enforcement actions, whether initiated by the 
SEC or by a private party through an implied right of action 
share the same general goal:  “to maintain public confidence 
in the marketplace.”  Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).  Yet, this unity of purpose belies 
some fundamental differences.  That distinctions exist 
between private and SEC civil enforcement actions is, by no 
means, revelatory.
15
  Yet, since this is the primary reason that 
we invalidate the Appellants’ assertion of direct causation 
analysis as a requirement here, it is necessary to go beyond a 
mere acknowledgement of the differences to examine how 
and why this is so. 
  
Cases raised under an implied right in the Securities 
Acts rely upon analogous cases at common law.  See Rondeau 
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 63 (1975) (“[T]he 
conclusion that a private litigant could maintain an action for 
violation of the 1933 Act meant no more than that traditional 
remedies were available to redress any harm which he may 
                                                                                                     
enforcement case—makes its general reference to civil cases 
similarly inopposite. 
 
15
 See e.g. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 751 n.14 (1975);  Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 910 (1973);  SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 
F.2d 1082, 1096 & n. 15 (2d Cir. 1972); see also S.E.C. v. 
Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 212 -213 (2d Cir. 2012). 
23 
 
have suffered; it provided no basis for dispensing with the 
showing required to obtain relief.”).  Indeed, while Section 
13(d) and Section 10(b)—at issue here—did not incorporate 
common law fraud into federal law (See Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 
(2008)) an analogy has been applied virtually from the 
inception of implied-right cases between private enforcement 
actions and civil fraud claims.  See e.g. Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 544 U.S. at 343; Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975); Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512 (D.C. Pa. 1946).  
Accordingly, as we have long stated, “a plaintiff bringing suit 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must prove that the 
defendant i) made misstatements or omissions; ii) of material 
fact; iii) with scienter; iv) in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities; v) upon which the plaintiff relied; and vi) 
that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.”  In re 
Phillips Petroleum Securities. Litigation., 881 F.2d 1236, 
1244 (3d Cir. 1989);  see also Manufacturers. Hanover Trust 
Co. v. Drysdale Securities Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 
1986).
16
  Wellman, the case on which the Appellants rely, 
                                              
16
 This association to civil fraud claims is also apparent in 
heightened pleading requirements applied to Section 10(b) 
claims (15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).  
Moreover, this nexus was explicitly reinforced by Congress’ 
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  109 Stat 737, 
15 U.S.C, § 78u–4(2).  While the 1995 Act and its companion 
legislation in 1996 focus upon class action plaintiffs, these 
expectations for pleading have been applied to non-class 
plaintiffs as well.  Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 
F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007).   
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takes it a step further.  Denying the class plaintiff’s motion 
for disgorgement, the court said:  “Since class plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated that their alleged injury was directly caused 
by the Section 13(d) violation, the district court properly 
denied their claims for damages against Dickinson.”  
Wellman, 682 F.2d at 368 (emphasis added). 
 
In contrast, such comparisons to common law torts are 
not part of the jurisprudence or the statutory developments 
relating to SEC-initiated civil enforcement actions.  Rather, 
SEC civil suits are described as “promot[ing] economic and 
social policies.”  SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 
1993).  Courts have made it clear that the SEC pursues its 
claims “independent of the claims of individual investors.”  
Id.  The SEC has reinforced this notion, consistently stressing 
that “it is not a collection agency for defrauded investors.” 
George W. Dent Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities 
Law:  A Study in Federal Remedies,  67 Minn. L. Rev. 865, 
930 (1983).
17
  This has practical implications for the nature of 
civil suits brought by the SEC. 
 
  Stating the obvious, unlike private suits that redress 
the claims of particular shareholders:  “the Commission is not 
an injured victim . . . .” Whittemore, 659 F.3d at 11 n.2.  
Therefore, in proving Section 13(d) and 10(b) violations, the 
Commission need not prove reliance, nor must it show that 
any investor lost money as a result of the violation.  SEC v. 
Morgan & Co., Inc., 678 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(citing SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6
th
 Cir. 1985)).  
                                              
17
 But see Black, Barbara, Should the SEC Be a Collection 
Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus. Law 317 (2007-
2008).  
25 
 
These factors have no relevance to the question of whether 
someone violated the law.  Id.  Rather, in the Section 10(b) 
context it must show:  “(1) material misrepresentations or 
materially misleading omissions, (2) in the offer or sale of 
securities, (3) made with scienter.”  SEC v. Merchant Capital, 
LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 766 (11th Cir. 2007).   
 
 From all of this, we can easily conclude that the 
Appellants’ reliance upon Wellman is misplaced.  While there 
is strong legal support for the application of tort-based 
proximate causation analysis in the context of private 
enforcement litigation, we have no such authority on which 
we can rely to impose any such requirement on SEC-initiated 
civil actions.  See SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 212-13 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (The court eschews the defendant’s assertion of the 
need for evidence of proximate causation, because it is a 
concept that is derived from tort actions.).
18  
   
 With that said, where the SEC seeks a disgorgement 
remedy, the difference between private enforcement suits and 
SEC suits does not entirely eliminate the need for proof of a 
causal connection between the securities violation and the 
disgorged funds.  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit correctly said: 
 
Since disgorgement primarily 
serves to prevent unjust 
enrichment, the court may 
exercise its equitable power only 
over property that is causally 
related to the wrongdoing. The 
                                              
18
 See infra, n. 22. 
26 
 
remedy may well be a key to the 
SEC's efforts to deter others from 
violating the securities laws, but 
disgorgement may not be used 
punitively. 
 
SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. 
Cir.1989).  Therefore, the more difficult question is whether, 
in spite of the separate lines of decisional law that ground 
private and SEC enforcement action, the doctrine of novus 
actus interveniens has any place in the causal analysis that is 
triggered by SEC motions for disgorgement?
19
  Our answer in 
the affirmative, with considerable qualification, is drawn from 
a deeper assessment of the constituent elements of causation. 
 
 It is important to “clearly [distinguish] for separate 
analysis the empirical issue of causal contribution and the 
normative issue of the extent of legal responsibility.”  Richard 
W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush; Duty, Causal 
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 
Vand. L.R. 1071, 1080 (2001).  “[T]he phrase ‘proximate 
cause’ is shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all 
factual causes contributing to an injury should be legally 
cognizable causes.”  CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 
2630, 2642 (2011).  As a result, it is critical to account for the 
policy considerations that inform a particular approach to 
causation to ensure their compatibility with the policies that 
ground the cause of action.  
 
                                              
19
 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honoré, Causation in the 
Law, 73–74 (2d ed. 1985) pp. 73-74. 
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 Assessing legal liability through the lens of direct 
causation requires that we first look to tort causation 
generally.  Policies underlying the assignment of liability in 
tort law are by no means settled.
20
  Nonetheless, it 
traditionally has been  grounded in a balance of two goals: 
defining and deterring harmful conduct (consistent with 
prevailing social norms); and, redressing personal injury.
21
  
Yet, a third concern also has been given increasing weight 
over the years.  “[T]he loss causation requirement-as with the 
foreseeability limitation in tort-‘is intended to fix a legal limit 
on a person’s responsibility even for wrongful acts.’” Lentell 
v. Merrill Lynch  Co., 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citation to quotation omitted).  Direct causation, as a type of 
proximate causation, is focused upon limiting the liability of 
tortfeasors to the temporally and sequentially immediate 
consequences of an act.
22
  It is rooted primarily in a concern 
to protect against a defendant’s broad exposure to liability. 
  
 The widespread acceptance of tort-based approaches to 
causation regarding monetary remedies in private 
enforcement cases suggest that there is an alignment of the 
                                              
20
 See generally Wright, 54 Vand. L.R. 1071;  Jane Stapleton, 
Choosing what we mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 Mo. 
L. R. 433 (2008). 
 
21
 See generally Patrick J. Kelly, Proximate Cause in 
Negligence Law:  History, Theory and the Present Darkness, 
69 Wash.U.L.Q. 49 (1991).   
 
22
 W. Page Keeton et al. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts, at 174-76 (5th Ed. 1984).   
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policies underlying the assignment of liability in both tort 
actions and private enforcement actions.
23
  Certainly, our 
review of private enforcement cases shows convergent policy 
interests in adequately compensating plaintiffs for injury, 
while simultaneously protecting defendants from broad 
liability, as in Wellman.
 24
  Concerns also have been raised 
repeatedly about the abusive use of private enforcement and 
the negative impacts that such practices have on the market.  
See LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 
2008).  However, as we have already alluded to, the policies 
driving SEC-initiated civil enforcement suits are notably 
different. 
 
                                              
23
 A private enforcement action is not at issue here, and we 
make no conclusions about the propriety of applying direct 
causation analysis to private enforcement suits.  We do note, 
however, that the  Supreme Court also provided some basis 
for caution in making an assumption about the compatibility 
of tort principles to private enforcement actions, highlighting 
that remedies in enforcement actions are grounded in equity.  
Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 61-65; see also Bruschi v. Brown, 876 
F.2d 1526, 1530 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 
24
 See e.g. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 544 U.S. at 345. 
(“[T]he statutes make [private enforcement suits] available, 
not to provide investors with broad insurance against market 
losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that 
misrepresentations actually cause.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006); 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 
313 (2007).  
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 From the early days of the SEC’s pursuit of restitution, 
its enforcement mission plainly has been front and center.  
 
While in rare cases, as an adjunct 
to injunctive relief, the 
Commission has urged a court to 
deprive violators of their illegal 
gains by directing that these be 
paid to individuals who have been 
injured by their violations, even in 
such cases the Commission does 
not seek to make investors whole; 
it seeks merely to deter violators 
by making violations unprofitable. 
Thus, the Commission recently 
stated in one such case that it was 
‘not acting on behalf of the * * * 
[injured parties] to seek money 
damages. * * *’ It continued: ‘As 
a law enforcement agency it is 
requesting disgorgement of profits 
illegally obtained, because 
effective deterrence requires more 
than an injunction limited to 
future violations.’ 
 
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y.  1968) 
rev’d on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970)(quoting 
the SEC amicus brief).
25
  Accordingly, the SEC’s use of the 
                                              
25
 See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 
1308 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), ( “It would 
severely defeat the purposes of the Act if a violator of Rule 
30 
 
disgorgement remedy has been constructed around two 
objectives:  to ‘“deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment 
and to deter others from violating securities laws.” Hughes 
Capital Corp., 124 F.3d at 455 (quoting  First City, 890 F2d 
at 1230).  “[T]he court is not awarding damages to which 
plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising the chancellor’s 
discretion to prevent unjust enrichment.”  SEC v. 
Commonwealth Sec., Inc.¸ 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978).  
The goal is “not to compensate for losses but to deprive the 
wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”  Whittemore, 659 F.3d at 11 
n.2.
26
   
                                                                                                     
10b-5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation.”); 
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d at 1104 (“The 
effective enforcement of the federal securities laws requires 
that the SEC be able to make violations unprofitable. The 
deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be 
greatly undermined if securities law violators were not 
required to disgorge illicit profits.”); see also Rind, 991 F.2d 
at 1490 (“The theory behind the [disgorgement] remedy is 
deterrence not compensation.”); see also First City, 890 F.2d 
at 1232 n. 24 (“deterrence is the key objective”).  For a 
general discussion of the development of the disgorgement 
remedy in SEC civil enforcement actions, see John D. 
Ellsworth, “Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions 
Brought by the SEC,” 1977 Duke L. J. 641 (1977). 
 
26
 In this sense, Justice Douglas’ comments on divestiture in 
the antitrust context could be applied to the SEC’s use of 
disgorgement:  It is an “equitable remedy designed in the 
public interest to undo what could have been prevented had 
the defendants not outdistanced the government in their 
31 
 
 
 Moreover, significantly, the absence of a particular 
concern in our review pointed to another policy difference.  
We did not see evidence of widespread concern that SEC-
initiated enforcement actions were being used abusively.  As 
a result, we could not find any jurisprudential basis to 
conclude that policies underlying SEC enforcement actions 
are focused upon limiting the defendant’s exposure to 
remedial measures, beyond those imposed by general 
considerations of equity.  See e.g. First City Fin. Corp., 890 
F.2d at 1231.   
 
 In light of all of these policy distinctions, it is 
unsurprising that the analytic framework for determining a 
remedy in an SEC enforcement suit is different from private 
suits, placing the consideration of intervening causation in a 
different posture.  In First City, the court endorsed a burden 
shifting approach to causation in which the SEC is required to 
produce evidence supporting a reasonable approximation of 
“actual profits on the tainted transactions,” which is 
essentially satisfying a but-for standard.  Id. at 1231  This 
creates a presumption of illegal profits.  Id.  Once the SEC 
has made this showing, the burden shifts back to the 
defendant to “demonstrate that the disgorgement figure [is] 
not a reasonable approximation.”  Id. at 1232; accord Hughes 
Capital Corp., 124 F.3d at 455.
27
  The court added that “the 
                                                                                                     
unlawful project.”  Schine Chain Theatres v. U.S., 334 U.S. 
110, 128 (1948).   
 
27
 We read the term “reasonable approximation” in an 
equitable context, focusing on the fairness of the SEC’s claim 
to disgorgement.   
32 
 
risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal 
conduct created the uncertainty.”  Id.; see also Rest. (Third) 
Restituion § 51(5)(d).  In this context, First City cites to a 
case from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to 
elaborate that the defendant could make its case by “pointing 
to intervening events from the time of the violation.”  Id.  
(citing SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
   
We draw two immediate points from First City and 
MacDonald.  First, intervening causation is not an element of 
the SEC’s evidentiary burden in setting out an amount to be 
disgorged that reasonably approximates illegal profits.  
Second, if the issue of an intervening cause is to be raised, it 
will normally be the defendant’s burden to do so.   
 
Yet, even where evidence relating to an intervening 
cause is raised, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution (on 
which the First City framework appears to be based) suggests 
that the court should consider such direct causation evidence 
only in light of other factors.
28
  The Restatement envisions the 
court having wide discretion in deciding the amount to be 
disgorged:  “In determining net profit [for purposes of 
disgorgement] the court may apply such tests of causation and 
remoteness . . . as reason and fairness dictate.”  Rest. (Third) 
                                                                                                     
 
28
 Disgorgement is a type of restitution (See Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400-02 (1946)), and therefore the 
Rest. (Third) of Restitution provides a logical point of 
reference.   
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Restitution §51(5).
 29
  Moreover, although the official 
comments to the Restatement say that a court “may deny 
recovery of particular elements of profit on the ground of 
remoteness” (id. at comment f), it counsels caution in giving 
the degree of attenuation between the wrongdoing and the 
monies to be disgorged inordinate weight:   
 
To say that a profit is directly 
attributable to the underlying 
wrong, or (as sometimes 
expressed) that the profit is the 
“proximate consequence” of the 
wrong, does not mean that the 
defendant's wrong is the exclusive 
or even the predominant source of 
the defendant's profit. Indeed, 
because the disgorgement remedy 
                                              
29
 The use of the term “net profit” is siginificant, as it 
provides an indication of the boundary between remedial and 
punitive.  SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978).  
“Profit includes any form of use value, proceeds, or 
consequential gains (§ 53) that is identifiable and measurable 
and not unduly remote.”  Rest. (Third) Restitution § 51(4).  
Profit disgorgement (net benefit) is generally regarded as 
remedial and revenue disgorgement (gross benefit) is 
generally understood as outside the traditional realm of 
equity.  See Id.  § 51(4) & (5); see also SEC v. Cherif, 933 
F.2d 403, 414 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1991);  see also George P. 
Roach, “A Default Rule of Omnipotence:  Implied 
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal 
Agencies,”  12 Fordham. J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1 (2007).   
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is usually invoked when the 
defendant's profits exceed the 
claimant's provable loss, it should 
be possible in almost every case 
to identify additional causes of 
the profit for which the defendant 
is liable. 
 
Id.  This point is elaborated upon in an example.    
 
[I]f the defendant embezzles $100 
and invests the money in shares 
that he later sells for $500, the 
$500 that the claimant recovers is 
largely the result of causes 
independent of the wrong: 
favorable market conditions and 
the defendant's investment 
acumen or simply luck. The 
determination in this easy case 
that the embezzler's profit is 
properly attributable to the 
underlying wrong rests on a 
number of related judgments. The 
first, evidently a matter of 
causation, is a finding (or a 
presumption) that the defendant 
would not have made the 
investment (and realized the 
profit) but for the wrong. But 
causation in this sense gives only 
part of the answer. The conclusion 
that the defendant's profit is 
35 
 
properly attributable to the 
defendant's wrong depends 
equally on an implicit judgment 
that the claimant, rather than the 
wrongdoer, should in these 
circumstances obtain the benefit 
of the favorable market 
conditions, acumen, or luck, as 
the case may be. The conclusion 
draws further support from 
another implicit judgment, that 
there would be an incentive to 
embezzlement if the defendant 
were permitted to retain the 
profits realized in such a 
transaction. 
 
Id.   
 In light of all of this (the statute, the jurisprudence, the 
Restatement, and the policies grounding disgorgement 
remedies in SEC enforcement suits), we are not persuaded by 
Appellants’ argument that the SEC must do more than prove 
but-for causation to assert a reasonable approximation of 
illegal profits.  Moreover, as to the role of proximate 
causation in the court’s deliberation on SEC motions for 
disgorgement, we conclude that when evidence of an 
intervening cause is raised by the Defendant it is not 
dispositive.  The policies underlying the disgorgement 
remedy—deterrence and preventing unjust enrichment—must 
always weigh heavily in the court’s consideration of whether 
particular profits are legally attributable to the wrongdoing, 
36 
 
constituting unjust enrichment.
30
  It is within this context that 
the equitable power of the court to order disgorgement is 
properly exercised.  With this in mind, we turn to the 
evidence considered by the District Court. 
 
 The SEC introduced evidence of the Appellants 
violating Section 13(d) and Section 10(b), beginning on July 
30, 1998, by intentionally misrepresenting Teo’s beneficial 
ownership of shares held by the MAAA Trust, thereby 
underreporting the percentage of Musicland shares that he 
beneficially owned.  It also provided the court with evidence 
that the Appellants purchased 6.7 million Musicland shares 
after July 30, 1998, eventually achieving a combined 
ownership of over 35 percent of the company, all while 
falsely reporting that Teo did not have beneficial ownership 
of the MAAA shares.  Finally, the SEC documented that, 
while willfully still failing to correct the false filings, the 
Appellants sold all of the Musicland shares, obtaining over 
$21 million in profits from the portion of the shares that were 
tainted with reporting violations.  We agree with the District 
Court that this evidence presumptively demonstrated a 
reasonable approximation of the profits arising from 
transactions tainted by the Section 13(d) and Section 10(b) 
violations.
31
      
                                              
30
 This conclusion is consistent with the fact that the 
Restatement allows for consequential gains in its definition of 
net profits.  Rest. (Third) Restitution § 51(5). 
 
31
 In making this determination we take note that the District 
Court distinguished between profit that the Appellants earned 
from the sale of stock purchased before July 30, 1998, and 
stock earned after this date.  Additionally, in its final order, it 
37 
 
 The Appellants did virtually nothing to rebut this 
presumption.  They argued that the SEC failed to produce any 
evidence that the violations impacted the stock price.  Yet, 
having established a reasonable approximation of the profits 
tainted by the violation, the SEC met its evidentiary burden.  
The Appellants also asserted that the Best Buy tender offer 
was the direct, intervening cause of their profits.  However, it 
was the Appellants’ burden to provide the District Court with 
evidence that the SEC’s approximation of profits was 
unreasonable.  This burden is not simply one of carrying the 
ball back across the fifty-yard line by presenting a merely 
plausible alternative explanation for the profit.  Rather, the 
defendant must adduce—at a minimum—specific evidence 
explaining the interplay (or lack thereof) among the 
violation(s) at issue, the market valuation of the stock at fixed 
points in time, and any other cause for the profits they assert 
were untainted by illegality.  In so doing, they must account 
for the ambiguities, uncertainties and myriad market forces 
inherent to any analysis of fluctuations in stock pricing to 
credibly demonstrate the unreasonableness of the 
government’s proposed disgorgement.  Here, it might have 
been possible for Appellants to demonstrate that intervening 
causes made the profits in question greatly attenuated from 
                                                                                                     
reduced the disgorgement amount to account for the margin 
interest that the Appellants paid in connection with their 
trades of Musicland stock.  In doing so, the District Court 
properly distinguished between legal and illegal profit, and 
simultaneously met the equitable requirement that the amount 
to be disgorged must be remedial rather than punitive.  Blatt, 
583 F.2d at 1335.    
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the violations at issue, but they failed to do so.
32
  Merely 
positing the Best Buy tender offer as an intervening cause and 
pointing to evidence that Appellants did not bring it about 
was insufficient to overcome the presumption established by 
the SEC that its approximation of illegal profits was 
reasonable.
33
 
 
 Nonetheless, even if the Appellants had provided 
evidentiary support that the Best Buy tender offer was the 
direct cause of all of their profits, it would not have changed 
our conclusion that the District Court was within its discretion 
to grant the SEC’s motion for disgorgement.  As was noted in 
the example from the official comment to the Restatement: 
 
[The profit] that the claimant 
recover[ed] is largely the result of 
causes independent of the wrong: 
                                              
32
 For example, Exhibit 12 to the Appellants’ Memorandum 
in Opposition to the Motion for Disgorgement provides a 
transcript of the SEC’s opening remarks at trial in which they 
state that the Best Buy tender offer provided a $5 per share 
premium over the market price.  However, the Appellants 
never referenced this figure in the body of their argument 
before the District Court, or before this Court, and no context 
was given to this figure.  
 
33
 The equities of each case are assessed by the totality of the 
circumstances.  Suffice to say that, in this case, merely 
referencing the Best Buy tender offer only provided the 
District Court with the reason that the Appellants sold the 
tainted stock. 
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favorable market conditions and 
the defendant's investment 
acumen or simply luck. The 
determination in this easy case 
that the . . . profit is properly 
attributable to the underlying 
wrong rests on a number of 
related judgments. 
 
Rest. (Third) Restitution § 51 comment f.  The Best Buy 
tender offer is likely one cause of the Appellants’ profits.  
Yet, in the context of an SEC civil enforcement action, 
whether the Appellants’ profit resulted directly—from a 
causal perspective—from the wrongdoing or from the 
operation of dumb luck is not dispositive on the question of 
whether it is proper and fair to regard those profits as tainted 
by the wrongdoing.
34
  The court must make this judgment in 
equity, giving consideration to the elimination of unjust 
enrichment and the deterrent impact this action might have in 
                                              
34
 The Appellants argued before the District Court “[t]hat the 
Defendants happened to still be holding Musicland shares a 
year and a half after July 1998, and at the time they increase 
in value because of the Best Buy offer, is therefore not a 
sufficient basis to permit disgorgement as a matter of law.”  
To the contrary, the Appellants cannot now hide behind the 
time-span of their reporting violations and Teo’s fraud as an 
“undue attenuation” that prevents disgorgement when the 
magnitude of their profit was made possible by the length and 
scope of their wrongdoing, permitting them to accumulate a 
large cache of shares without the market’s awareness that 
resulted in enormous profit. 
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furthering future compliance with the Securities Exchange 
Act.   
 
 The SEC grounded its motion for disgorgement on 
Appellants’ serial Section 13(d) violations over the course of 
years, and on the jury’s conclusion that Teo’s conduct was 
motivated by fraud, in violation of Section 10(b).  While the 
Appellants were amassing Musicland shares, their collective 
misreporting and Teo’s flagrant fraud insulated the valuation 
of the Appellants’ Musicland stock holdings from the effects 
of a poison pill that could have been activated if the extent of 
their holdings in the company had been known.  These were 
serious violations of Section 13(d) enabling the Appellants to 
acquire a sizeable ownership interest in a publically traded 
company without the awareness of company directors, fellow 
shareholders, the SEC, or the market-at-large.  Moreover, all 
of this was done with conscious intent, violating Section 
10(b).  See Rest. (Third) Restitution § 53(2).  These 
fraudulent acts enabled Appellants to surreptitiously acquire 
and hold a large volume of stock that, in turn, netted huge 
profits when sold to Best Buy.  It is precisely this type of 
shadowy dealing that the Securities Exchange Act—and 
specifically Section 13(d) and Section 10(b)—was designed 
to combat in order to uphold the integrity of the stock market.  
In light of all of this, the District Court rightly judged the 
enforcement objectives to weigh decisively in favor of 
disgorgement.  This decision was only made easier by the fact 
that the Appellants provided virtually no evidence to support 
a contrary conclusion.  Moreover, by limiting the 
determination of unjust enrichment to only the shares 
acquired after the reporting violations began—leaving all 
other profit untouched—the District Court guarded against an 
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overreach that would have transformed the award into a 
punitive measure.  
 
 For all of these reasons, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by determining that the profit the 
Appellants realized from selling the stock they acquired while 
consciously violating the law unjustly enriched the 
Appellants, and that the enforcement objectives of this cause 
of action warranted ordering the Appellants to disgorge 
$17,422,054.13. 
 
VI. 
 Finally, the Appellants challenge the District Court’s 
order that they pay $14,649,034.89 in prejudgment interest.  
They generally stress that there is no need for any interest 
payment at all, but they focus their appellate argument on a 
challenge to the timeframe on which the interest is based and 
the use of the IRS tax underpayment rate to calculate the 
amount owed.  It is within the District Court’s equitable 
discretion to decide whether payment of interest should be 
ordered, and to decide upon both the interest rate and the 
period of time on which the interest will be calculated.  See 
SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1476 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  
 
 The Appellants assert that the District Court’s decision 
to award prejudgment interest from January 2001 through 
December 2011 was unfair, given their claims that over half 
of that time was due to delays that were either beyond their 
control, or were the result of holdups for which the SEC was 
solely responsible.  However, given that the Appellants were 
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in control of their ill-gotten gains throughout this entire 
period, the District Court did not exceed its discretion in 
ruling that it had no evidence that a reduction in prejudgment 
interest for considerations of fairness was warranted.   
  
 We next examine the District Court’s application of 
the IRS underpayment rate as the interest rate here.  The 
SEC’s request for this rate of interest on disgorged sums was 
consistent with its own regulation.  17 CFR § 201.600.  We 
conclude that, as this is the rate that prevents unjust 
enrichment by approximating the interest rate for a loan (See 
Id. at 1476-77; SEC v. Platforms Wireless Inter. Corp., 617 
F.3d 1072, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010)), the District Court’s choice 
of this rate was reasonable, and well within its discretion.    
 
VII. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the Order of the 
District Court. 
1 
 
SEC v. Teo, No. 12-1168 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part 
A court may exercise its equitable power to order 
disgorgement “only over … property causally related to the 
wrongdoing.”  CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 
78-79 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Because there is no legitimate dispute that Best Buy’s tender 
offer was independent of the Appellants’ securities law 
violations,
1
 the profits on their sale of Musicland stock that 
are solely attributable to Best Buy’s tender offer should not 
be subject to disgorgement.  That is not to say that the balance 
of their profits is untainted.  The remaining profits may well 
be subject to disgorgement to one degree or another, but 
whether they are or not is a determination that the District 
Court should make in the first instance, while properly 
addressing the question of causation.  For that reason, I would 
vacate the District Court’s disgorgement order and remand 
the case, and I therefore respectfully dissent from that part of 
the Majority’s opinion that affirms the District Court’s ruling 
on disgorgement. 
 
“As an exercise of its equity powers, the court may 
order wrongdoers to disgorge their fraudulently obtained 
profits.”  SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 
1997).   But “an order to disgorge is not a punitive measure; it 
is intended primarily to prevent unjust enrichment.”  
                                              
1
 Specifically, the jury found that Teo had violated the 
antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-6, and that both Teo and the Trust had violated 
the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 
§ 13(d) and Rules 13d-1 and 13d-2. 
2 
 
Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SEC v. 
Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that 
disgorgement is aimed at “depriv[ing] the wrongdoer of his 
ill-gotten gain” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Given 
that the primary goal of disgorgement is to prevent unjust 
enrichment, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit observed in SEC v. First City 
Financial Corp. that there must be a causal relationship 
between the property to be disgorged and the proven 
wrongdoing.  890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  More 
specifically, there must “be a relationship between the amount 
of disgorgement and the amount of ill-gotten gain.”  Am. 
Metals Exch., 991 F.2d at 79; see also Bilzerian, 29 F.3d at 
696.  That causal link is what makes disgorgement a remedial 
measure rather than a punitive one.  As the Majority rightly 
acknowledges, “[t]he remedy may well be a key to the SEC’s 
efforts to deter others from violating the securities laws, but 
disgorgement may not be used punitively.”  (Maj. Op. at 27 
(quoting First City, 890 F.2d at 1231).)
2
 
                                              
2
 It is well-established that “[r]etribution and 
deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental 
objectives.”  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 
(1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 539, n.20 (1979)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Despite that, the notion that deterrence is an 
acceptable goal of disgorgement has entered our 
jurisprudence via First City.  See, e.g., SEC v. Hughes Capital 
Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Disgorgement is an 
equitable remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his 
unjust enrichment and to deter others from violating securities 
3 
 
The Appellants rely on Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), to argue that “the SEC bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the profits sought to be 
disgorged ‘proceed directly and proximately from the 
violation claimed.’”3  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 58 (quoting 
Wellman, 682 F.2d at 368).)  The Majority answers by  
distinguishing Wellman, and I accept my colleagues’ 
conclusion that a direct and proximate causation standard is 
not applicable in this case, that a lower “but-for” standard of 
causation will suffice.  The Majority also adopts the burden-
shifting framework from First City, in which the SEC has the 
initial burden of showing “a reasonable approximation of 
‘actual profits on the tainted transactions,’ … [which] creates 
a presumption of illegal profits.”  (Maj. Op. at 33 (quoting 
First City, 890 F.2d at 1231).)  Implicit in the statement that 
the transactions are “tainted,” though, is a recognition that the 
SEC must have satisfied its initial burden of showing 
causation by producing evidence that a violation occurred and 
                                                                                                     
laws.” (quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
3
 The Appellants do not dispute that disgorgement is 
an appropriate remedy when, as in this case, a defendant has 
violated §§ 10(b) and 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 
nor could they credibly do so.  See, e.g., First City, 890 F.2d 
at 1230 (“[D]isgorgement is rather routinely ordered for 
insider trading violations … [and] [w]e … see no relevant 
distinction between disgorgement of inside trading profits and 
disgorgement of post-section 13(d) violation profits.”); SEC 
v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993), aff’d, 29 
F.3d 689 (“Defendant must disgorge the profits he obtained 
as a result of … violations [of §§ 10(b) and 13(d)].”). 
4 
 
that some plausible relationship exists between that violation 
and the profits gained.   
 
With that showing, it may be “proper to assume that all 
profits gained while defendants were in violation of the law 
constitute[] ill-gotten gains,” SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 
116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 689.  Hence, as the 
Majority holds, the SEC’s initial burden can be satisfied by 
demonstrating that, but for a defendant’s illegal actions, the 
profits would have been different.  That is a sensible 
approach, as the risk of uncertainty about how differently 
events would have unfolded “should fall on the wrongdoer 
whose illegal conduct created that uncertainty.”  First City, 
890 F.2d at 1232; see also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 
55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (adhering to the principle that 
“doubts are to be resolved against the defrauding party”). 
 
Here, the SEC made a showing that the shares of 
Musicland stock that the Appellants acquired after July 30, 
1998, were tainted because, but for the Appellants’ failure to 
properly disclose information, the Appellants would have 
obtained their shares of Musicland stock under different and 
presumably more expensive market conditions.  Had, for 
example, Teo disclosed his true beneficial ownership and his 
plans to change Musicland’s Board or take Musicland private, 
Musicland’s stock price may well have increased.  To the 
extent the Majority relies on such reasoning, I agree with 
them that the SEC met its initial burden to establish that a 
plausible relationship exists between the Appellants’ 
securities violations and the profits gained.
4
 
                                              
4
 I use the term “profits gained” as shorthand for the 
$17,422,054.13 in net profits, excluding margin interest paid, 
5 
 
But disgorgement is not an all-or-nothing matter.  
Again, only the extent of profits with a causal connection to 
the wrongdoing – i.e., the ill-gotten gains – are subject to 
disgorgement.  See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55 (holding that 
not all subsequent profits are subject to disgorgement, only 
those “based upon the price of [the] stock a reasonable time 
after public dissemination of the inside information”).  Thus, 
once the SEC has made the initial showing required to 
presumptively establish causation, “the burden shifts … to the 
defendant to ‘demonstrate that the disgorgement figure [is] 
not a reasonable approximation.’”  (Maj. Op. at 33 (alteration 
in original) (quoting First City, 890 F.2d at 1232).)  That 
burden warrants some clarification.  When the SEC comes 
forward with a reasonable approximation of tainted profits, 
the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to 
produce evidence showing that all or some part of the sum in 
question should not be subject to disgorgement.  As the court 
in First City explained, a defendant must show that “the 
disgorgement figure [i]s not a reasonable approximation … , 
for instance, by pointing to intervening events from the time 
of the violation.”  See First City, 890 F.2d at 1232.  Proof of 
an intervening cause is therefore one way that a defendant can 
challenge a disgorgement calculation, because an intervening 
cause indicates that not all of the profits are, in fact, tainted 
by wrongdoing. 
 
Here is where it seems I part from my colleagues’ 
view of the case.  It is true that the SEC met its initial burden 
of showing that some plausible relationship exists between 
                                                                                                     
that the District Court determined were not already subject to 
the penalties imposed in connection with Teo’s insider 
trading conviction. 
6 
 
the Appellants’ violations and the profits they gained.  
However, it is also true that the Appellants then pointed to the 
Best Buy tender offer as an independent cause.  Neither the 
District Court nor the Majority appropriately accounts for the 
Best Buy tender offer.  While the Majority pays lip service to 
the limiting principle that, to avoid being a punitive measure, 
a disgorgement order must be limited to ill-gotten gains, my 
colleagues do not actually apply that principle to the admitted 
premium associated with the Best Buy transaction.
5
 
 
The Majority states that “[t]he Appellants do not 
appeal the calculation of the disgorgement, but rather assert 
the District Court wrongly granted the SEC’s motion for this 
remedy.”  (Maj. Op. at 22.)  Admittedly, at oral argument the 
Appellants called the causation analysis a threshold issue, 
separate from the calculation of disgorgement.  But the 
Appellants’ submission of an independent cause is perfectly 
sensible as a challenge to the calculation of a disgorgement 
figure: implicit in their argument is the notion that the District 
Court’s disgorgement figure is incorrect and that they should 
not be penalized with respect to the Best Buy transaction.  Cf. 
Am. Metals Exch., 991 F.2d at 79 (“In crafting any 
                                              
5
 Used in the context of a tender offer, a “premium” is 
generally the “amount over market value paid.”  John 
Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman, Dictionary of Finance 
and Investment Terms 531 (7th ed. 2006).  In other words, it 
is the amount that Best Buy paid for Musicland’s stock in 
excess of the stock’s trading value at the time of the tender 
offer.  The Majority cites “a $5 per share premium over the 
market price” (Maj. Op. at 39 n.32), and the SEC seems to 
place the premium at $4.55 per share, or “a 60% takeover 
premium” (Appellee’s Br. at 62). 
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disgorgement remedy on remand, the district court should 
keep in mind the limitation placed on its equitable powers by 
th[e] requirement that there be a relationship between the 
amount of disgorgement and the amount of ill-gotten gain.” 
(emphasis added)); First City, 890 F.2d at 1230 (addressing 
intervening causes within “the question of how the court 
measures th[e] illegal profits”); Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. at 121 
(discussing intervening causes within “[t]he sole remaining 
issue [of] what portion of the[] profits is subject to 
disgorgement”).  Indeed, my colleagues consider the 
Appellants’ evidentiary burden in the context of showing that 
a “disgorgement figure” is an unreasonable “approximation of 
profits” (Maj. Op. at 33, 39 (emphasis added)).  On the 
briefing and record before us, the Appellants’ independent-
cause argument fairly calls into question the disgorgement 
figure.
6
 
 
The Best Buy tender offer is clearly an independent 
and intervening event.  It bears no relationship to the 
Appellants’ securities violations.  According to Musicland’s 
CEO, Teo “had nothing to do with finding Best Buy” (J.A. at 
318) and was neither involved in the initial discussions nor 
informed about them by Musicland.  In addition, Best Buy 
                                              
6
 My colleagues view the Appellants’ argument as an 
effort to rebut the SEC’s showing of but-for causation in the 
burden-shifting framework that they have adopted.  I agree 
that it aims to rebut causation.  The Appellants expressly 
argue that they “would not have earned [their] profits had 
Best Buy not made its tender offer” and, thus, point to a break 
in causation.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 66.)  That does not 
mean, however, that the argument is irrelevant when 
considering the extent of disgorgement. 
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was fully aware of the combined ownership of Teo and the 
Trust, notwithstanding Teo’s public disclaimer of beneficial 
ownership of the Trust’s shares, and Best Buy required both 
Appellants to sign “Shareholder Support Agreements” to 
tender or otherwise sell all of their Musicland shares in 
connection with Best Buy’s planned tender offer.  (J.A. at 
751-57, 758-64, 1814.)  The Appellants have consistently – 
and, in light of those facts, credibly – maintained that the Best 
Buy tender offer constitutes an entirely independent cause of 
profit on their stock.   
 
Nevertheless, the District Court’s comment as to a 
connection between the Appellants’ violations and the Best 
Buy transaction was that “the Best Buy tender offer 
constituted a market correction that Teo anticipated when he 
bought what he considered to be undervalued shares,” as if 
anticipating that shares are undervalued were, in itself, 
somehow inappropriate.  (J.A. at 20.)  Making a profit on 
undervalued shares, however, is a strategy pursued by law-
abiding investors all the time.  There is nothing suspect about 
it.  No logical reason has been proposed by anyone for 
presuming a connection between the Appellants’ profit 
associated with the Best Buy tender offer and any 
wrongdoing.  The Majority, meanwhile, faults the Appellants 
for “[m]erely positing the Best Buy tender offer as an 
intervening cause.”  (Maj. Op. at 39-40.)  But the Appellants 
have not simply uttered the words “Best Buy.”  They have 
cogently explained, with citations to the record, why the Best 
Buy tender offer was independent of all action (or inaction) 
on their part.  (See Appellants’ Opening Br. at 65-66 (citing 
J.A. at 318, 705, 708-10).)  In light of the undisputed facts, it 
is difficult to fathom how the Best Buy tender offer could be 
anything other than an independent cause. 
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The Majority states, without any supporting authority, 
that the Appellants’ “burden is not simply one of carrying the 
ball back across the fifty-yard line” but one of “adduc[ing] – 
at a minimum – specific evidence explaining the interplay (or 
lack thereof) among the violation(s) at issue.”  (Maj. Op. at 
39.)  I fundamentally disagree with that assertion.  It is 
axiomatic that “the SEC bears the ultimate burden of 
persuasion.”  First City, 890 F.2d at 1232.  Therefore, once a 
defendant has pushed back with evidence of what is more 
likely than not an intervening cause, it is the SEC’s 
responsibility to carry the ball. 
 
Again, a key point that is lost in the Majority’s football 
analogy is that disgorgement is not an all-or-nothing 
proposition.  While, “[i]n the insider trading context, courts 
typically require the violator to return all profits made on the 
illegal trades,” id. at 1231, courts may limit disgorgement to 
an amount based on the price of the stock “a reasonable time 
after public dissemination of the inside information,” 
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 55.  For example, in MacDonald, the 
appellant had violated the antifraud provisions of § 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act by purchasing a company’s stock without 
disclosing the fact that the company would be acquiring an 
office building and likely negotiating a profitable long-term 
lease of space in that building.  Id. at 48.  When the company 
publicly announced that acquisition and potential lease the 
following day, the price of the stock jumped.  Id. at 49.  The 
appellant held on to the stock for more than a year, after 
which he sold at an even higher price.  Id.   
 
On appeal, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, considered 
the question of  
10 
 
 
whether, where [a defendant] fraudulently 
purchased company shares while in possession 
of material non-public information[,] [he should 
be required, in an action brought by the 
Commission,] to disgorge the entire profits he 
realized from his subsequent sale of those 
securities about a year later, rather than limiting 
disgorgement to an amount representing the 
increased value of the shares at a reasonable 
time after public dissemination of the 
information. 
 
Id. at 52 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court answered in the negative, holding that 
profits made as a result of stock price increases after a 
reasonable time following the disclosure of inside information 
“are purely new matter” and not subject to disgorgement.  Id. 
at 54.  “To call the additional profits made by the insider who 
held until the price went higher ‘ill-gotten gains,’ or ‘unjust 
enrichment,’ is merely to give a dog a bad name and hang 
him.”  Id.   
 
To illustrate, the MacDonald court presented two 
hypotheticals, both under the assumption that an insider 
fraudulently bought stock at $4 per share and that, for the 
entire month after the inside information became public, the 
stock sold at $5 per share.  Id. at 52.  In the first scenario, the 
insider sold the stock for $5 during that month.  Id.  For this 
scenario, the court reasoned that the SEC could properly seek 
$1 per share as ill-gotten gains.  Id.  The court then posited a 
second scenario in which the stock price later increased to 
$10 per share, at which point the insider sold his shares.  Id.  
11 
 
The SEC argued that the disgorgement in this second scenario 
– analogous to the exact facts before the MacDonald court – 
should be $6 per share.  Id.  The court, however, disagreed 
with the SEC’s assertion, noting that to award the entire 
actual profits as disgorgement would be to measure 
disgorgement “by purely fortuitous circumstances.”  Id. at 54.  
The court held that the “further profits were not causally 
related” to the wrongdoing and that, “absent some special 
circumstances,” an insider’s subsequent decision to retain his 
original investment should not create any “legal or equitable 
difference.”  Id.  Therefore, the court concluded that “[t]here 
should be a cut-off date” for the profits to be disgorged and 
remanded for the district court to “determine a 
[disgorgement] figure based upon the price of [the] stock a 
reasonable time after public dissemination of the inside 
information.”  Id. at 54-55; see also SEC v. Manor Nursing 
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to 
extend disgorgement to income subsequently earned on the 
initial illegal proceeds). 
 
By limiting disgorgement to a reasonable time after 
public dissemination of inside information, the court in 
MacDonald soundly cordoned off profits that were too 
attenuated from the non-disclosure and insulated them from 
disgorgement.  MacDonald therefore stands for the 
proposition that, when there is a clear break in causation, only 
profits attained prior to that break are subject to 
disgorgement.  Any additional profits, coming as they do 
from fortuitous circumstances, are not sufficiently related to 
the wrongdoing to be subject to disgorgement. 
 
Unlike in MacDonald, the information that the 
Appellants withheld in this case was not later released to the 
12 
 
market.  Nevertheless, the premium that Best Buy offered was 
unrelated to the wrongdoing at issue and created an analogous 
causal break.
7
  As we have previously emphasized, “[i]n 
crafting any disgorgement remedy ... , the district court 
should keep in mind the limitation placed on its equitable 
powers by th[e] requirement that there be a relationship 
between the amount of disgorgement and the amount of ill-
gotten gain.”  Am. Metals Exch., 991 F.2d at 79.  By awarding 
disgorgement on the profits related to the Best Buy 
transaction, the District Court abused its discretion.
8
  And by 
                                              
7
 What sort of fortuitous event might constitute an 
intervening cause is not a question that lends itself to a 
broadly applicable response.  Such a determination is fact-
specific.  Looking at the facts of this case, I am confident that 
the Best Buy transaction is an intervening cause.  It had an 
obvious and discernible market effect that can, and has, been 
estimated by both the Majority and the SEC.  Perhaps that is 
why the SEC confines itself to arguing that the Appellants 
should not avoid disgorgement entirely, rather than 
contending that the Appellants’ violations and the Best Buy 
tender offer are causally linked. 
8
 A challenge to the calculation of a disgorgement 
award based on findings of fact is subject to clear error 
review, SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
but we are addressing the Appellants’ challenge that the 
District Court did not properly limit the disgorgement award 
such that the Court overreached its equitable powers.  The 
Majority is thus correct that an “abuse of discretion” standard 
applies.  Id.  With respect to calculating disgorgement, it 
bears repeating that, “despite sophisticated econometric 
modeling, predicting stock market responses to alternative 
variables is[] ... at best speculative.  Rules for calculating 
13 
 
failing to limit disgorgement to ill-gotten gains, my 
colleagues effectively endorse a penalty assessment, in the 
name of enforcing federal securities law.  Accordingly, I 
dissent.
9
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
disgorgement must recognize that separating legal from 
illegal profits exactly may at times be a near-impossible 
task.”  First City, 890 F.2d at 1231.  For that reason, courts 
“have rejected calls to restrict disgorgement to the precise 
impact of the illegal trading on the market price,” and the 
amount of disgorgement “need only be a reasonable 
approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.”  
Id. at 1231-32. 
9
 Because the SEC sought, and the District Court 
imposed, a civil penalty equal to the amount of disgorgement, 
remanding the disgorgement award may have an effect on the 
civil penalty.  The prejudgment interest on both amounts 
would also presumably be affected by a change in the 
disgorgement figure. 
